Historical climate change agreements have largely failed to achieve ambitious emission reductions due to fundamental flaws in the international negotiating structure and the core principles guiding these negotiations.
Despite international negotiations ongoing since the 1992 Earth Summit, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased by one-third since the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). As a result, the world is not currently on track to meet the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C.
The main reasons historical climate change agreements have resulted in inadequate outcomes include:
1. The State-Centric Negotiating Framework
The United Nations system, which houses the climate negotiations, utilizes a state-centric top-down decision-making approach based on the principle of sovereign equality of its members.
• Sovereignty Over Ecology: While ecological and climate change issues are borderless and require a functional, cooperative response, governments remain stuck in the state-centric framework. This approach has proven inadequate, with the primary cause of the Copenhagen debacle (2009) being attributed to state-centric national interest veiled in the guise of sovereignty.
• Consensus Veto Politics: The 1992 Convention adopted procedural rules based on a consensual approach, which frequently allows a single country to exercise a veto, leading to endless delay and impasse. This consensus-based decision-making has been widely criticized in the aftermath of major agreements.
• Major Emitters as Free Riders: Because the framework prioritizes national interests, major emitters remain free riders who have yet to agree upon quantified targets to address the problem.
2. Dysfunctional Principles and Political Gridlock
The climate change negotiations are founded on the principles of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), historical responsibility, and equity. While intended to ensure fairness, the inability to redefine or modify these principles is central to the lack of ambitious outcomes.
• The North-South Division: The principles of CBDR and historical responsibility divide the world into Annex I (developed) and Non-Annex I (developing) countries. This division has resulted in "dysfunctional North-South Politics," which is considered the regime’s greatest weakness.
• The "You First Attitude": The current framework leads to a perennial "you first attitude". Developing countries decline to make commitments until industrialized countries cut their emissions first, while industrialized countries demand binding commitments from emerging economies.
• Refusal to Accept Binding Commitments:
◦ Industrialized countries, like the USA, Canada, Japan, Russia, and New Zealand, renounced or refused the extension of the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that it was meaningless to take on new targets when emerging economies had none. The European Union (EU) stated it could not solve global warming alone, noting it was responsible for only 11% of global emissions and needed the help of those emitting the other 89%.
◦ Major emerging economies (BASIC countries: Brazil, South Africa, India, China) have insisted that future agreements be built upon the intact principles of the Convention, including CBDR. India and China require that all negotiations adhere to principles of equity. China has remained unwilling to discuss the prospect of mandatory emission reductions.
3. Inadequate and Non-Binding Measures
The agreements adopted have been insufficient to counter rising emissions:
• Voluntary Failures: The initial voluntary approaches under the UNFCCC were realized to be inadequate for stabilizing GHGs.
• The Weakening of Kyoto: The Kyoto Protocol (1997) was a legally binding treaty that set emissions targets for industrialized countries. However, the USA did not ratify it, criticizing it as unfair because it did not require developing countries to take action. The Protocol only covered 15 percent of total global emitters in its second commitment period and was considered non-tangible by the IEA.
• The Copenhagen Accord's Limits: The resulting Copenhagen Accord (2009) proposed only voluntary targets and utilized a voluntary bottom-up approach that lacked legal standing within the UNFCCC process. These pledges were far less ambitious than the overall goal needed to stabilize GHGs.
The combined failure of these agreements means that GHG concentrations continue to rise, consistent with a long-term global temperature increase of more than 3.5°C by 2035 under current policies, potentially reaching 3.6°C to 5.3°C compared to pre-industrial levels.
To achieve the ultimate goal of stabilizing GHG concentrations, a radical transformation is required, including the reframing and redefinition of the debate around CBDR to ensure all industrialized nations and major developing country emitters commit to quantified emission reductions.
The current deadlock in climate negotiations is like two halves of a ship passing in opposite directions. The "developed" half insists the "emerging" half must help steer immediately because the shared environmental storm is worsening quickly. But the "emerging" half refuses to take the wheel until the "developed" half, which previously fueled its engines unrestricted, accepts full historical liability and compensation for the damage already done, leading both halves to continue full speed ahead toward disaster.
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