State-centric national interests are argued to be the main reasons for inadequate outcomes in climate change negotiations, directly leading to the continuing rise in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The inadequacy stems from the way the United Nations (UN) system operates and the core priorities states assert in the negotiating framework.
The key ways state-centric national interests contribute to ongoing GHG increases include:
1. Sovereignty and Economic Prioritization
The international political system, founded on the post-Westphalian idea of sovereignty, assumes a state-centric top-down decision-making approach can solve global problems like climate change. However, since climate issues are borderless and do not respect state-centric sovereignty, this framework is inadequate for managing the global challenge.
• Sovereign Right to Development: Major emerging economies, including the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), along with Russia (BRICS), have remained firm on their sovereign right to development and their economic interests. Developing countries need to continue their economic growth to lift millions out of poverty, and they argue that emission reduction should not be achieved at their economic cost.
• Business-as-Usual Approach: China and the rest of the developing world have continued to burn fossil fuels in a "business-as-usual" manner. This reliance on fossil fuels, driven by rapid growth, seriously increases their emissions. In the future, increasing emissions are expected due to high economic growth in major emerging economies.
• Overtaking Commitments: If flexibility and serious commitments are not made, agreements could result in false promises or be overtaken by economic and developmental interests, resulting in rapid increases in carbon emissions from advanced and emerging economies alike.
2. The Negotiation Gridlock and "You First" Attitude
The reliance on state-centric negotiation leads to a perennial problem known as the "you first attitude," which prevents serious mitigation efforts.
• Developed vs. Developing Divide: Developing countries refuse to make any binding commitments until industrialized countries begin to cut their emissions, and vice-versa. This state-centric impasse creates a gridlock.
• Refusal to Accept Binding Targets: Major emitters from the Umbrella Group (including the USA, Canada, Japan, Russia, and New Zealand) have indicated they would not take quantified targets unless major emitters from developing countries were bound by quantified emissions targets. The USA, for instance, refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it viewed it as unfair and ineffective since developing countries were not required to limit their emissions.
• Contrasting Positions on Responsibility: The developing world maintains that developed countries caused the climate problem through unrestricted emissions during their industrialization and must fix it, relying on the principle of historical responsibility. The EU, however, dismissed the argument that the West alone should fix the problem, noting the EU was responsible for only 11 percent of global emissions and could not solve global warming without the help of countries emitting the other 89 percent. This recurring question of how these contrasting state-centric positions can come to terms with reducing global GHG emissions remains unanswered.
3. Obstruction via State-Centric Principles and Procedures
The underlying principles of climate negotiations, combined with the procedural rules of the UNFCCC, facilitate blockages that prevent ambitious, binding action required to limit emissions.
• Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR): While the principle of CBDR states that developed countries should lead, it has become the regime’s greatest weakness, creating a division that results in "dysfunctional North-South Politics". As currently framed, this principle prevents the pragmatic measures necessary to mitigate emissions by breaking the gridlock. Even if all industrialized countries reduced emissions by 100 percent, global emissions would still rise unless major developing country emitters commit to mitigation.
• Consensus-Based Veto Power: The 1992 Convention adopted procedural rules for a consensual approach in reaching decisions, which often gives a veto to a single country. This state-centric, consensus-based procedure has been criticized as being obfuscated by the large number of parties, allowing countries to block negotiations. The continuous failure of negotiations over the years testifies to the inadequacy of this approach.
Due to these state-centric national interests, international negotiations have made very little progress in arresting climate change, resulting in global GHGs increasing by one-third since the UNFCCC adoption in 1992. Scientists agree that the current voluntary pledges and commitments would likely result in 3.5-4°C warming, far above the 2°C limit deemed necessary to avoid potential climate catastrophes.
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